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Abstract 
 
A role-playing game (RPG), KatAware, was developed in the Kat River 
catchment of South Africa to support the negotiation process among water 
users on the allocation rules of the resource. Playing the RPG with local 
stakeholders exhibited some regularity in the behaviour of players, particularly 
on their attitude of defining binding agreements. These regularities were first 
formalized through a model of cooperative game theory (CGT), and then, to 
confirm the results of the model, tested by an experimental protocol. Both the 
model and the protocol were based and calibrated on the results of the RPG. 
The progressive simplification (decontextualization) required to bring the RPG 
into the laboratory suggested to explore the role of context (in our case water 
related issues) on players’ behaviour.  The objective of this paper is to illus-
trate the process that conducted the research team from the experience in the 
Kat River to the first experiments to test the hypotheses exhibited in the ex-
perience and then to analyze the influence of context on players’ behaviour. 
Terms and concepts are clarified in order to provide a clear research frame-
work in this new field at the border between experiences and experiments in 
social sciences for commons management.   
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper presents and discusses a research trajectory that started with the 
construction of a Role-Playing Game (RPG) to support local decision-making 
about water management, continued with the development of an experimental 
protocol to test economic hypotheses exhibited by the RPG and developed 
into the analysis of the influence of context on players’ behaviour. 
 
Having crossed a somehow wide field, which ranges from two extremes which 
could be identified as “experience” and “experiment”, has prompted us to a re-
flection on the similarities and distinctions between these two terms and also 
on the dimensions among which this diversity is expressed. 
 
We believe that there is scope for some clarification, which is needed at least 
for two reasons: 
- on one side, there are a lot of works and different viewpoints about the 
so-called “participatory approach”, so that some cleaning would be wel-
come; 
- even more important, the terminology usually used in these works is not 
consistent across different disciplines. This fact emerged strikingly, for 
instance, during the meeting “Experimental Design for Resources Man-
agement Instruments” (Montpellier, 2008). Clearly, on issues like water 
management, which naturally involve the contribution of various disci-
plines, it is important to achieve a preliminary clarification on the differ-
ent meanings that the same term displays. 
 
The emphasis in this paper will be on the illustration and explanation of the 
concepts and terminology defining the research framework within which our 
programme was developed, aiming at giving al least partial answers to the 
questions raised above. 
 
The text is organized as follows. The research trajectory is described in Sec-
tion 2. Section 3 illustrates and discusses the research framework, main 
terms and concepts. Section 4 concludes and provides the way forward of this 
research program. 
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2. Research trajectory 
A RPG called KatAware (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2007) was developed within a 
project based on an approach called Companion Modelling (ComMod Group, 
2003) to reproduce the functioning of a real catchment, the Kat River, and al-
low local stakeholders (members of a Water User Association, WUA) to play 
around water manage-
ment in order to : 
- understand the 
complexity of the 
system; 
- understand the re-
lations between 
agents; 
- understand the im-
pact of different wa-
ter allocation 
strategies on the 
water flows, the 
profits, employment 
and domestic users’ 
satisfaction; 
- build up a catch-
ment strategy within 
the WUA. 
 
 
 
Map 1: The Kat River Valley (Rowntree and al. 2006) 
In some ComMod experiences, like the one in the Kat River, the researcher 
starts building a first preliminary model to explicit the theoretical “pre-
conceptions” (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2007). The confrontation of this first 
model with the stakeholders allows revising and re-building it, taking into ac-
count the field situation and the stakeholders’ questions and remarks. This 
dynamic process leads to the construction either of a new model derived from 
the previous one or a totally new one. Stakeholders learn collectively by creat-
ing, modifying and observing simulations (ComMod Group, 2003). RPGs are 
used in ComMod processes in order to facilitate stakeholders’ participation 
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and understanding of the models. Local stakeholders take part in the design 
process of an RPG. As a consequence, RPGs developed with ComMod are 
unique. Therefore, it is impossible to replicate the same experience with oth-
ers players in order to gather and analyse data. Rouchier (2006) stresses that 
the first and most obvious limit of ComMod RPGs is “the lack of accumulation 
of a knowledge that could be generalized to more than one situation”.  
 
During a RPG session many social phenomena may be observed and some 
can be seen as ‘exhibits’, consisting in empirical regularities for which, at the 
time, there are no well-developed theoretical explanations (Sugden, 2005). 
The two RPG sessions played during the ComMod experience in the Kat al-
lowed observing cooperation among the different players in the use of the wa-
ter available from the dam situated upstream the catchment. This observation 
suggested an attempt of comparison between the results obtained through 
one of the two RPG sessions and a cooperative game theory (CGT) model 
calibrated on the same data (Dinar et al., 2008). The comparison showed 
some similarities between the RPG results and the model outcomes in terms 
of players’ behaviours and the distribution of profits (payoffs) among players. 
It was an encouraging result with regard to the attempt to compare outcomes 
emerged through both empirical and theoretical approaches. However, these 
two approaches showed many differences that cannot allow concluding defi-
nitely about the robustness of such similarities in the outcomes. Replications 
were therefore needed to verify the soundness of the results. Consequently 
the idea emerged to construct a “polished”, though still contextualized game 
derived from the RPG used in the Kat to replicate experiments in order to test 
cooperative behaviour of agents around water allocation and subsequent 
payoffs sharing. 
 
The resulting experimental set-up, called KatGame, aimed at testing the CGT 
hypotheses that lie behind these results. The following aspects were particu-
larly targeted in our analysis:  
 
1) Players’ rationality (selfishness) and profit maximization;  
2) Players’ capacity to take advantage of the side payments in coalitions;  
3) Players’ behaviour in terms of resources (water, land) allocation within a 
coalition;  
4) Players’ choice to stay in partial coalitions or in a grand coalition; 
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5) Allocation of coalition’s payoffs and comparison with the theoretical refer-
ence (e.g. the Shapley value). 
 
Illustr.1: Experimental sessions: The KatGAME protocol (University of Pretoria) 
The experiment consists of a water resource management game. Water is 
stored in a dam. Three farmers, cabbage producers, require water from the 
dam if they want to irrigate a larger area than their initial endowment. The 
game is played over a single period, corresponding to a simulated year. 
 
The CGT model backing the game has the same structure of the model de-
veloped by Dinar et al. (2008). The farmers have the same initial land en-
dowment (20 Ha) and different production functions. Each farmer may in-
crease his irrigated land to a maximum of 40 Ha. If a farmer chooses to in-
crease the irrigated area, then he needs water from the dam. In that case, he 
must request an additional amount of water from the dam manager (played by 
the experimenter). A portion of the water in the dam must be preserved for 
domestic consumption and the ecological reserve. 
 
The experiment is composed of three phases, during which the three farmers 
play first as singletons and with no communication, then in partial coalitions 
(informal groups), and finally all together in a grand coalition (irrigation board). 
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Within coalitions, side-payments are allowed. The side-payments theory is 
based on the assumption that “the coalitional utility function is expressed in 
units of a divisible commodity which stores utility, and which can be trans-
ferred without losses to the players” (Parrachino et al., 2006). Payoffs of a 
coalition can be divided among the members of the coalition in any possible 
way. As in “transferable-utility games” (Parrachino et al., 2006), it is possible 
to transfer money (i.e. the divisible commodity) among players in order to 
reallocate the profit gained through the coalition.  
 
KatGame was tested twice with students of the University of Pretoria (Desolé, 
2007). Players’ behaviour as observed during the tests was very close to the 
rational one assumed in the CGT model, and this determined a high corre-
spondence between the results of the game and those of the model, as the 
distribution among players of grand-coalition payoffs was very close to the 
Shapley value, considered here the theoretical reference (Tisdell and Harri-
son, 1992). 
 
Nevertheless, KatGame had still the characteristics of a partially contextual-
ized RPG, and resulted in a long procedure made of several phases. This 
made replication and control of experiments difficult and suggested to simplify 
further the protocol. KatLab was then constructed. It consists of a “one shot” 
game, where three players will be given the results of a super-additive CGT 
set-up and will choose whether or not to stay in the grand coalition and the 
distribution among players of the grand coalition payoff. This distribution will 
then be compared with the theoretical reference provided by the Shapley 
value. 
KatLab will be played in two versions: a contextualized one, where a “story” 
about water will be presented to players and where payoffs are a direct con-
sequence of water allocations, and an abstract one, where no water context 
exists and players allocate tokens resulting in payoffs. The question ad-
dressed by these two versions of the same protocol consists in analyzing the 
influence of water-related context on players’ behaviour. The hypothesis 
made here is that the statistical deviation of results with respect to the theo-
retical reference (Shapley value) is smaller when playing the abstract version 
than when playing the contextualized one.  
 
Answering this question can have heavy consequences in the near future on 
the development of tools to facilitate stakeholders’ water governance and 
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common decision-making. The study of the influence of context may allow 
understanding whether the management of the commons requires dedicated 
protocols or, conversely, a “universal” and generic protocol exists. If protocols 
about the management of the commons (water among them) can be de-
contextualized, then standard methods could be transferred from one place to 
another and at different times. Conversely, results could show that methods 
are strictly dependent from the issue at stake (water in our case).   
 
It is interesting to observe that the objectives of the three tools (KatAware, 
KatGame and KatLab) are different and reflect the evolution of the research 
questions emerged all along the programme: KatAware was a RPG aimed at 
improving stakeholders’ knowledge and negotiations; KatGame was a first at-
tempt to simplify the RPG into a laboratory tool to test hypotheses emerged 
during the RPG sessions and previously formalised into a CGT model; KatLab 
is a further step into the experimental environment, the protocol is extremely 
simplified and does not only aim to test economic hypotheses, but also (and 
rather) to understand the impact of context into players’ behaviour by compar-
ing results of sessions played in the abstract set-up with results of sessions 
played in the contextualised one. 
3. Conceptual framework 
We have moved from an experience with local stakeholders (the Kat River 
Water User Association) into an attempt of experimental use of a RPG with 
candid players (students at University of Pretoria), and will be using an hyper 
simplified protocol deriving from the RPG with both candid and expert players 
to try to understand the importance of water context on players’ behaviour.  
 
It seems important at this stage to clarify the concepts and terms that back 
our research trajectory: what are the research questions driving our steps? 
What is the significance of an experience? In what an experiment differs from 
an experience? Why do we need to create an experimental environment?  
This section attempts to provide elements of clarification to the above ques-
tions and set up a research framework within which our trajectory will then be 
positioned. 
 
We all make experiences every day. Meeting people, watching a movie, driv-
ing our car are all experiences that leave a footprint in our memory and there-
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fore have an impact on our behaviour. From experiences we learn how to be-
have through a “learning by doing” process that begins the first day of our life.  
 
Experiences are therefore “facts” that happen and that nobody can avoid to 
face just because they are part of our life. We are interested here in the char-
acteristic that experiences have to allow the learning process in people that 
go through them. This characteristic was used as an argument by the phi-
losophers and scientists of the 17th Century like Bacon and Galileo to support 
the scientific method based on the inductive process that tests hypotheses 
through factual data collection and verification of the validity of these hy-
potheses by creating an environment where an observed phenomenon could 
be reproduced.  
 
The simple reproduction of a (natural) phenomenon in a laboratory can be 
considered as an (artificial) experience, as conditions are created ad hoc in 
order to allow people to perceive and observe the “fact” or the phenomenon at 
least once. The observed phenomenon can also be measured through quanti-
tative or qualitative analyses. 
 
A further and crucial step towards the formalization of knowledge was made 
through the capacity of replicating the same experience in a reasonably con-
trolled environment. These two characteristics (replication and control) repre-
sent the discriminatory criteria that transform an experience into an experi-
ment. The possibility to control in a laboratory (as much as possible) the vari-
ables used to describe a phenomenon is essential to be able to replicate this 
phenomenon ad libitum and always reaching the same result. We might 
therefore suggest that the real criterion of distinction between an experience 
and an experiment is control, as whether this is possible, replication comes as 
a consequence. In other terms, an experience can be replicable, but not nec-
essarily maintaining constant (or modifying in a controlled way) its parameters 
and therefore its outcomes. 
 
Summarising (Figure 1), we are not interested here in all experiences of real 
life, but only in those that are artificially (A) reproduced, through the creation 
of artefacts or situations (table games, cards, drama, etc. ). These artificial 
environments allow people (those participating for instance in a game or in a 
drama representation) to observe (O) what happens, interact each others and 
measure (M) the experience’s outcomes.  
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Figure 1 – Real life, Experience and Experiment domains according to 
the criteria of artificiality, observation, replication and control 
 
Participants go therefore through a “learning by doing” process and improve 
their knowledge on the reproduced phenomenon. The difference between a 
“real life” experience and an artificial one consists in the fact that the latter 
was intentionally provoked through the construction of an artificial environ-
ment and that, for this reason, can be performed at any time, anywhere and 
with any participant.  
Such an experience is usually a “tool to tell”, as its objective is to facilitate 
knowledge dissemination and people’s interactions. An experience can also 
be replicated (R), but with no total control on the parameters backing the rep-
resentation of the phenomenon at stake. 
 
When this capacity of control (C) comes into play, then we move from the field 
of an artificial experience into the one of an experiment. Experiments are “tool 
to test” as they usually are constructed to test scientific hypotheses in a con-
trolled environment and through the replication of the same protocol to verify 
statistically the robustness of results. 
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The nature of data and information (D) required to construct an artificial ex-
perience is substantially different from the one required for an experiment. As 
experiences are tools to tell, they tend to put participants into realistic situa-
tions as much as possible, by reproducing the environment (the context) 
where they would be facing the phenomenon at stake in their real life.  
 
Conversely, an experiment is a tool to test hypotheses and therefore the 
quantity of information required for its construction is very specific and related 
to the variables to control.  
 
Figure 2 – Our research trajectory within the proposed conceptual 
framework 
 
This information must be very precise and accurate on the aspects to be con-
trolled and tested, but in order to reduce the elements of “noise”, it should be 
reduced to the minimum necessary to conduct the experiment.  
 
Our research trajectory can be introduced in this conceptual framework as in-
dicated in Figure 2.  
 
KatAware was a RPG developed and played with local stakeholders in order 
to enhance their knowledge and facilitate discussions about water allocation 
Real Life
Experience
Experiment
A
R
O
C
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M
 11 
strategies. The objective of KatAware was to create an artificial environment 
similar to the real one and allow participants making a common experience 
about water management. The willingness to test CGT hypotheses emerged 
from the observation of KatAware results conducted the research team to de-
velop KatGame, a contextualized experimental protocol derived from 
KatAware. Due to its complexity and relatively high level of contextualization, 
KatGame proved difficult in terms of replication and control.   
 
KatLab was therefore constructed as an extremely simplified protocol derived 
from KatGame and aimed at controlling all variables of the experiment in the 
laboratory and replicating it as much as required in order to get statistically 
verifiable results.  
 
Meanwhile, the research question of our programme shifted from the test of 
CGT hypotheses into the analysis of the influence of context (related to water) 
on players’ behaviour. A second version of KatLab was then constructed and 
contained elements of water context in the form of a “tale” about water that 
players were confronted with when playing the game. 
 
This very recent development of our research programme can be represented 
as in figure 3, where both the abstract and contextualized versions of KatLab 
are indicated.  
 
Wang (2006) considers that the process of context building within a protocol 
by adding contextual bricks can be defined as a “bottom-up” approach. Mak-
ing reference to this terminology, we define a “top-down” approach the proc-
ess consisting in the degradation of context in a protocol. 
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Figure 3 – Top-Down and Bottom-Up approaches for the Kat Lab ex-
perimental protocol 
 
In Figure 3 we make the hypothesis that an experiment can have different 
levels of contextualization and put the two versions of KatLab in the experi-
mental sphere. The comparison of results from playing the two versions (con-
textualized and abstract) of Kat Lab is likely to provide elements of response 
to the research question “does water context influence players’ behaviour?”. 
This approach will also invert the path (top-down) chosen so far in our trajec-
tory by introducing a bottom-up component. More precisely, from the com-
parison of results obtained by adopting the two approaches, elements of re-
sponse to the research question will emerge. 
 
4. Conclusion and perspectives 
 
This paper describes the research trajectory followed by a research team in-
terested in social aspects of water management and governance. The interest 
of the presented reflexions does not reside in the results obtained through the 
research work so far, but rather in the attempt to conceptualize the research 
framework developed concomitantly with the emergence of new research 
questions.   
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From an objective of support to local stakeholders and capacity building, the 
programme developed first into a test of economic hypotheses and then into 
the analysis of the influence of water-related context on players’ behaviour.  
 
To reach these very different objectives, the research team developed tools 
and approaches that range from role-playing games to experimental proto-
cols. Scientifically, the research trajectory followed by the team could be syn-
thesized as a progressive move from (artificial) experiences to experiments. 
The interest of this paper consists in the attempt to formalize this trajectory by 
providing a first conceptual framework within which the various steps of the 
research trajectory could be identified.  
 
The definition and clarification of concepts and terms required for the con-
struction of the framework might be useful to produce at term a common basis 
for researchers involved in social experiences and experiments in the field of 
common pool resources management.   
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